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Abstract 
The  strategic bequest motive implies that children  may want to live with their parents and 
provide care for them with the expectation of inheriting a larger portion of their bequest. This 
paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the transition to coresidence by elderly Japanese 
parents and their children using underutilized Japanese panel data. Unlike previous studies, 
evidence for the bequest motive is generally tenuous. In addition, our use of a two-component 
mixture logit model identifies the minority group of families that follows the bequest motive and 
the majority group that does not. (93 words) 
Key words: informal care, intergenerational transfer, bequest motive, living arrangements, 
coresidence, finite mixture logit, health shock. 
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1.   Introduction 
In aging societies, the need for long-term elderly care is increasing at an unprecedented rate. 
Despite  high  opportunity costs of providing informal care, filial informal care remains an 
important source of old-age support. According to the OECD (2005), children provide 41% of all 
informal care provided in the U.S., 43% in the U.K., and 60% in Japan.
 2
In addition to altruism and “norms”, the economic literature offers many other selfish 
reasons for the provision of informal care. The strategic bequest motive (Bernheim et al., 1985), 
among others, suggests that a child may want to live with his or her parent(s) and provide care 
for them with the expectation of inheriting a larger portion of their bequest. The empirical 
significance of this hypothesis has considerable policy implications for the public support for 
frail or disabled elders and their families. Previous studies regarding the bequest motive have had 
mixed results. While previous findings based on Japanese data are largely consistent with the 
bequest motive (Horioka, 2002; Kohara and Ohtake, 2006; Yamada, 2006; Kureishi and 
Wakabayashi, 2009), recent studies based on U.S. data have found evidence against the 
hypothesis (Sloan et al., 1997; Perozek, 1998; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Sloan et al., 2002; 
Brown, 2007). 
 
                                                 
2 The definitions could vary across countries. The figures for the U.S., U.K., and Japan are based 
on data from 1994, 2000, and 2001, respectively.   3 
In this paper, we reexamine the empirical relevance of the bequest motive in the context 
of informal care by focusing on parent-child coresidence in Japan. We focus on intergenerational 
coresidence, because it appears to be the most comprehensive form of filial informal care and 
support for elderly parents with a long-term commitment. In Japan, filial informal care overlaps 
closely with parent-child coresidence. For elderly Japanese receiving any nursing care, the most 
common primary caregiver is a coresident child or a coresident child’s spouse (32%); only 11% 
are cared for by non-coresident family members (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 
2008). This paper capitalizes on this salient role of parent-child coresidence in Japan. 
Using the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA hereafter), 
we investigate determinants of the transition to coresidence by elderly Japanese parents and their 
children. We apply binary choice models, in which the dependent variable is whether an elderly 
parent without resident children begins coresidence with an adult child by the next observation 
point.  
This study advances the existing literature in three ways. First, we study transition. Most 
existing economic studies that examine motives for intergenerational coresidence rely on the 
static approach (Yamada, 2006; Wakabayashi and Horioka,  2006).  Existing  studies on the 
dynamics of living arrangements are primarily demographical and sociological research and do 
not examine economic hypotheses regarding motives (Brown et al., 2002; Hays et al., 2003;   4 
Dostie and Léger, 2005; Takagi et al., 2007). The focus on transition helps us fill this gap by 
offering two significant advantages.  Transition analysis provides a clearer interpretation of 
causality than cross-section analysis. For example, an observed association between coresidence 
and parental ill health may be explained by the effect of coresidence on health.
3
Second, we explicitly address family  heterogeneity, which has been overlooked in the 
existing literature. Different families may have different motives. Permitting heterogeneity offers 
a more precise microscopic overview of family decisions. To account for family heterogeneity, 
we estimate a Heckman and Singer (1984)  type binary  logit  model with finite mixture 
components. This model also alleviates downward bias caused by unobserved family-specific 
 Furthermore, 
transition analysis provides a clearer framework to study the consequence of the heightened 
needs of elderly parents. Unlike the static framework, transition analysis allows us to exclude 
life-long coresidence where a child has never left the parental home and focus on new 
coresidence where a parent living independently initiates coresidence with an adult child. These 
two types of intergenerational coresidence could arise from different motives. Takagi et al. 
(2007) point out that traditional life-long coresidence is primarily a value-driven, rather than a 
needs-driven, arrangement. 
                                                 
3 Several studies report that living arrangements influence the health of the elderly, suggesting 
that a reverse causal effect could exist (e.g., Sarwari et al., 1998 and Michael et al., 2001).   5 
heterogeneity. In addition, we estimate the model separately for fathers and mothers to account 
for gender differences. 
Third, the richness of the NUJLSOA allows us to explore various causal effects and 
motives. The data contains detailed information on elderly parents and their coresident and non-
coresident children. To examine the bequest motive, we utilize information on the views of 
parents and their plans regarding bequest. The panel structure of the data provides sufficient 
observations for transition analysis with a large number of covariates. This study is the first to 
examine various motives and determinants of intergenerational coresidence comprehensively 
with careful treatment of causality. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, the transition to parent-child coresidence is often 
associated with parental ill health, confirming that coresidence is motivated by parental care 
needs. Second, unlike previous studies on Japan, the evidence for the bequest motive is generally 
tenuous. Variables that can test the bequest motive directly are mostly insignificant, even after 
accounting for possible downward bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, all 
significant results that appear consistent with the bequest motive, including the effect of parental 
house-ownership on coresidence, have alternative explanations. Third, Japanese families exhibit 
noticeable heterogeneity. The mixed component logit model identifies the minority group of 
families exhibiting behavior that is consistent with the strategic bequest motive and the majority   6 
group exhibiting behavior that contradicts the hypothesis. The results also reveal significant 
gender differences. 
2.  Motives for Coresidence and Related Literature 
2.1.  Evidence from Surveys 
Table 1: Parental Reasons for Living with Their Children 
Reasons (Multiple answer)  Male  Female 
1.  To financially support my child  13.12%  5.83% 
2.  To receive financial support from my child  13.01%  11.03% 
3.  To help with housework  5.46%  6.69% 
4.  To help raise grandchildren  8.61%  6.00% 
5.  To have my child take care of me  18.57%  23.04% 
6.  It’s what my child wants  22.70%  20.14% 
7.  It’s what I want  18.17%  9.67% 
8.  Because I want to be there for my child  5.10%  2.78% 
9.  Being with my child supports me mentally  11.72%  16.46% 
10.  I can receive advice from my child  7.22%  3.31% 
11.  I can give my child advice  9.70%  8.90% 
12.  My spouse passed away  1.26%  11.08% 
13.  My child are not independent yet  6.08%  4.01% 
14.  My child are not married  19.22%  14.13% 
15.  I can provide a house for my child  14.62%  13.50% 
16.  I have newly built house  3.55%  5.54% 
17.  Other reasons  20.44%  17.80% 
Number of observations  125  186 
Note: From the NUJLSOA data (Waves 1 to 4), weighted by sampling weights. Respondents are 
those who began coresidence with a child within the last two years. 
The NUJLSOA asks elderly parents who began coresidence with a child within the last 
two years reasons for the coresidence. The result is reported in Table 1 and shows us that the 
reasons vary widely, including parental altruism, parental needs, and reasons that are difficult to 
interpret. This table is suggestive, but many questions remain regarding why parents and children 
“want” to live together and why some parents live without their children. This study explores 
these questions.   7 
2.2.  Hypotheses on Coresidence and Informal Care in the Literature 
2.2.1.  Strategic Bequest Model 
In the strategic bequest model proposed by Bernheim et al. (1985), parents use their bequest as 
an incentive to exert care and attention from their children. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
Bernheim et al. (1985) find a positive and significant relationship between the bequeathable 
wealth of parents and the attention received from their children. However, recent studies using 
data from the U.S. have consistently found evidence against the strategic bequest motive. 
Perozek (1998) and Brown (2007) both find that parental assets do not affect the provision of 
informal care by children. Likewise, the socio-economic status  of parents is negatively 
associated with time-transfer from children (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Sloan et al., 2002) and 
with coresidence with children (Hotz et al., 2008). 
In contrast, empirical findings based on Japanese data are largely consistent with the 
strategic bequest hypothesis. These findings can be categorized into three groups. First, parental 
views on bequest and the actual division of bequests show greater consistency with the bequest 
motive in Japan than in the U.S. (Horioka, 2002). Second, parental house-ownership and house 
size are positively related to intergenerational coresidence (Kim, 2004; Takagi et al., 2007).
4
                                                 
4 Wakabayashi and Horioka (2006) find the effect of home-ownership on coresidence to be 
insignificant. 
   8 
However, we know of no studies that examine the effect of parental assets other than houses on 
informal care and coresidence in Japan. Regarding the effect of parental income and education 
on coresidence and informal care in Japan, previous studies have mixed results (Kim, 2004; 
Kohara and Ohtake, 2006;  Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006;  Takagi et al., 2007).  Third, 
inheritance expectation is positively related to coresidence and coresidence intention in Japan 
(Yamada, 2006;  Kureishi and Wakabayashi, 2009). Murakami (2006), however,  finds that 
coresidence raises the inheritance expectations of the children. The positive correlation between 
inheritance expectation and coresidence could also arise from unobserved heterogeneity in the 
degree of mutual child-parent altruism and the availability of other children.
5
The strategic bequest motive does not apply to parents having only one child because they 
cannot credibly threaten the child with disinheritance (Bernheim et al., 1985). Previous studies 
find that having more children increases the probability of coresidence in Japan and the U.S. 
(Brown et al., 2002; Hays et al., 2003; Dostie and Léger, 2005; Takagi et al., 2007; Hotz et al., 
2008). This is consistent with the bequest motive, although it allows for other explanations. 
 
2.2.2.  Other Hypothesized Motives 
Other Exchange Motives: Inter Vivos Transfers and Grandparenting   The exchange motive 
                                                 
5 Yamada (2006) has no information on the presence of siblings. Kureishi and Wakabayashi 
(2009) control for the number of children, but not their circumstances such as marital status.   9 
first proposed by Cox (1987) is a broader notion, meaning that parents and children exchange 
time-related  services  and  money  or goods. Whereas the bequest motive  predicts  financial 
transfers at the death of parents, the exchange motive may lead to inter vivos transfers. Henretta 
et al. (1997) find that, in the U.S., past inter vivos transfers from parents are a strong predictor of 
future filial informal care. Similarly, Tabuchi (2008) finds that parental financial assistance for 
the house purchase of a child is positively associated with geographical proximity between the 
parents and children in Japan. In addition, parents might reward children by providing childcare 
for grandchildren (Wolff, 2001; Kim, 2004; Yamada, 2006). 
Demonstration Effect   Cox and Stark (1995) present a model in which the amount of care and 
attention children provide to parents affects the amount of future intergenerational transfers 
received from their own children. Thus, their model predicts that the presence of grandchildren 
has positive effects on  transfers from children to parents. Wolff (2001) finds that whereas 
individuals with small children are more likely to visit their parents in France, those with older 
children are not. Wolff (2001) concludes that the motivations of the children are to receive 
childcare assistance from their parents, rather than providing a future role model.  
Dynasty Model   The dynasty model by Chu (1991) assumes that the objective of the parents is 
to perpetuate the family line. This model predicts that one child inherits the family line together 
with the family house and/or business, receives a bequest from the parents, and lives with the   10 
parents. Consistent with this hypothesis, the eldest son in Japan is more likely to live with his 
parents than are the other children (Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006). 
Pure  Altruism   Testing for filial pure altruism is generally not straightforward  because 
evidence against one selfish hypothesis (such as the strategic bequest motive) can be obscured by 
other selfish motives and alternative hypotheses (such as social norms and family traditions). 
Nevertheless, the literature regards the negative effects of parental economic strength on time 
transfers from children as a supporting evidence for pure altruism (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; 
Sloan et al., 2002; Hotz et al., 2008). Another supporting finding is the positive relationship 
between parental cognitive problems and the provision of nursing care by the children (Sloan et 
al., 1997). 
2.2.3.  Other Determinants of Living Arrangements 
There are determinants other than motives that affect the utility gain and cost of coresidence and 
informal care, such as relocation costs, severity of disability, and access to formal care. Jellal and 
Wolff (2002) discuss intergenerational cultural transmission, suggesting that parental behavior 
might affect the children’s utility function. 
2.3.  Existing Studies on Transitions in Living Arrangements 
The vast majority of aforementioned studies that  explore the motives for informal care and   11 
coresidence are  based on cross-sectional analyses.
6
3.  Data 
 On the other hand, previous studies that 
examine transitions in living arrangements based on panel data focus on identifying predictors of 
transitions rather than on testing economic hypotheses regarding motives. These studies indicate 
that factors such as ill-health, disabilities, widowhood, and having unmarried children are all 
positively associated with the transition to coresidence with children (Mickus et al., 1997; Brown 
et al., 2002; Hays et al., 2003; Dostie and Léger, 2005; Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006; Hotz et 
al., 2008). Takagi et al. (2007) find that Japanese elderly parents with functional disabilities are 
more likely to be in newly-resumed (or “boomerang”) coresidence than in independent-living or 
in life-long coresidence. 
The data is derived from the NUJLSOA, a nationally representative survey of the population 
aged 65 and over.
7
                                                 
6 A notable exception is Brown (2007), who uses a dynamic structural model. 
 The four waves of the survey were conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006. 
The first wave sampled 4,997 individuals and the sample response rate was 74.6%. The second 
and third waves sampled additional cohorts of 65 and 66 years old. 
7 To collect data from a sufficient number of respondents  aged 75 years and older, this 
population was oversampled by a factor of 2 in the first wave. For the details of the NUJLSOA, 
see http://www.usc.edu/dept/gero/CBPH/nujlsoa/.   12 
Table 2 provides background information on the prevalence of different types of living 
arrangements of the Japanese elderly. Living with a child is most common, with about 50% of 
elderly Japanese living with a child. The second most common living arrangement is living with 
a spouse only. Over time, a steadily-declining share of elderly parents live with a child, and an 
increasing share of elderly parents live either alone or with a spouse only. Mothers are more 
likely to live without a spouse, probably due to their longer life expectancy and their tendency to 
marry older men. 
Table 2: Living Arrangements across Socio-Demographic Groups 
Wave 1 (1999)  All  Parents  Fathers  Mothers  Married  Widowed  Work 
Living alone  12.0%  9.8%  4.5%  14.1%  0.2%  26.8%  8.0% 
Spouse only  31.5%  31.0%  42.4%  22.0%  47.5%  0%  32.9% 
Spouse & child  29.0%  31.2%  41.4%  23.0%  47.7%  0%  41.1% 
Spouse & others  2.8%  2.7%  4.0%  1.7%  4.2%  0%  3.4% 
Single & child  21.6%  23.2%  7.2%  36.0%  0.4%  67.7%  13.7% 
Single & others  3.2%  2.1%  0.6%  3.2%  0.1%  5.6%  1.0% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Wave 4 (2006)  All  Parents  Fathers  Mothers  Married  Widowed  Work 
Living alone  14.8%  12.6%  6.4%  17.9%  0.6%  33.9%  7.6% 
Spouse only  35.2%  34.9%  44.9%  26.4%  53.3%  0%  35.7% 
Spouse & child  26.3%  27.9%  37.7%  19.6%  42.6%  0%  40.9% 
Spouse & others  1.9%  2.0%  2.8%  1.4%  3.1%  0%  1.5% 
Single & child  19.3%  20.5%  7.3%  31.6%  0.3%  60.2%  13.9% 
Single & others  2.6%  2.1%  1.00%  3.1%  0.1%  6.0%  0.4% 
 Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Note: Data from the NUJLSOA, weighted using sampling weights. Except for the first column 
titled  “all”, the figures are based on individuals with at least one surviving child.  Parents 
classified as “living with a child” may also live with other family members. “Others” include 
anyone other than the parent’s own child and spouse. 
Table 3 shows the transition in living arrangements between waves. The large diagonal   13 
entries  clarify that  living arrangements of the elderly appear to be largely stable.
8
The population of interest in this study is elderly individuals aged 65 years and older with 
at least one surviving child.  We use three comparison periods:  1999/2001,  2001/2003, and 
2003/2006. The unit of observation consists of an elderly parent who completed two consecutive 
surveys. The elderly parent must have at least one surviving child in both surveys. The definition 
of a child includes biological, step, and adopted children, but not children-in-law. Furthermore, 
 For both 
singles and couples, living with a child is associated with higher probabilities of transition to 
death than transition to living without a child. This observation highlights the important role of 
children in the provision of informal care to sick or disabled elderly parents. From the states 
“living alone” and “spouse only”, the most common transitional change other than death is to 
initiate  living with a child by the next wave. The  elderly parents living with “others” (i.e., 
individuals other than the spouse and children) are less likely to begin living with a child by the 
next wave, suggesting that there is no available or willing child to live with. Among the different 
types of living arrangements, living with others is relatively unstable. This pattern indicates the 
differing nature of parent-child and parent-others interactions, with the latter being relatively 
provisional and unstructured. 
                                                 
8 The living arrangements during the period between 2003 and 2006 are less stable because this 
period is a 3-year interval.   14 
because our focus is on the transition to coresidence, we require that an elderly parent does not 
live with any child in the base year. We also restrict the sample to elderly parents who have no 
surviving parent throughout the period to avoid the complications added when elderly parents are 
also in the position of a “child.” However, this is rare. We exclude observations of those in a jail 
or hospital at any time during the period, or in a nursing home during the base year. Those with 
data issues such as critical missing values and inconsistent answers  and those labeled by 
interviewers as “unreliable” respondents are also excluded. Our final sample consists of 1,944 
elderly father-periods and 1,902 elderly mother-periods. 
Table 3: Changes in the Living Arrangements of Elderly Parents 
1999 
2001  Living alone  Spouse only  Spouse & child  Spouse & others  Single & child  Single & 
others 
Living alone  83.85%  3.04%  0.27%  4.58%  3.61%  21.90% 
Spouse only  1.01%  84.30%  6.36%  27.62%  0.38%  0.00% 
Spouse & child  0.00%  5.27%  80.46%  15.67%  0.31%  0.00% 
Spouse & others  0.00%  0.95%  1.75%  38.06%  0.07%  0.00% 
Single & child  9.38%  0.75%  5.75%  2.59%  84.09%  11.69% 
Single & others  1.25%  0.00%  0.05%  0.60%  4.16%  40.07% 
Death  4.51%  5.68%  5.37%  10.89%  7.39%  26.33% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
2001 
2003  Living alone  Spouse only  Spouse & child  Spouse & others  Single & child  Single & 
others 
Living alone  86.46%  4.30%  0.37%  0.68%  3.25%  14.74% 
Spouse only  1.20%  87.41%  7.88%  25.34%  0.00%  0.00% 
Spouse & child  0.00%  3.53%  80.68%  16.47%  0.49%  0.00% 
Spouse & others  0.00%  0.69%  1.71%  41.87%  0.00%  0.00% 
Single & child  5.19%  0.16%  4.87%  0.85%  84.03%  12.67% 
Single & others  2.18%  0.06%  0.00%  3.37%  4.51%  40.34% 
Death  4.97%  3.86%  4.49%  11.42%  7.72%  32.25% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
2003 
2006  Living alone  Spouse only  Spouse & child  Spouse & others  Single & child  Single & 
others 
Living alone  81.14%  5.43%  0.30%  1.42%  4.75%  18.13% 
Spouse only  0.43%  81.20%  8.90%  30.66%  0.18%  0.00% 
Spouse & child  0.36%  4.90%  77.91%  9.38%  0.52%  0.00% 
Spouse & others  0.00%  1.08%  1.78%  40.77%  0.00%  0.00% 
Single & child  8.38%  1.01%  3.82%  0.00%  77.52%  16.16%   15 
Single & others  1.22%  0.18%  0.22%  1.51%  4.68%  28.33% 
Death  8.46%  6.18%  7.07%  16.27%  12.34%  37.37% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Note: Data from the NUJLSOA, weighted using sampling weights. The population studied is 
elderly parents with at least one surviving child in the base year. “Others” include anyone other 
than the parent’s own child and spouse. 
Dependent Variable   The dependent variable is a binary variable for the transition of an elderly 
parent to coresidence with a child during a particular comparison period. Table 4 reports the 
sample size and frequency of the transition in the three periods. Between 1999 and 2006, 115 
(5.9%) of father observations (5.9%) and 150 mother observations (7.9%) began coresidence. Of 
the parents who began coresidence, about 90% accommodated the child who moved into their 
house; the remaining parents moved geographically.
9
Table 4: The Number of Observations Used in the Analysis 
 
Year 
Male  Male   Male   Female   Female   Female  
Total  Not coresided  Began 
coresidence  Total  Not coresided  Began 
coresidence 
1999 – 2001  685  637 (93.0%)  48 (7.0%)  651  599 (92.0%)  52 (8.0%) 
2001 – 2003  644  617 (95.8%)  27 (4.2%)  643  605 (94.1%)  38 (5.9%) 
2003 – 2006  615  575 (93.5%)  40 (6.5%)  608  548 (90.1%)  60 (9.9%) 
Total  1,944  1,829 (94.1%)  115 (5.9%)  1,902  1,752 (92.1%)  150 (7.9%) 
 
Explanatory Variables   This study exploits a large set of explanatory variables consisting of 
parent and child characteristics, inheritance history, informal care experience, and personal 
attitudes about social  norms and values.  The variables are defined in Table 5. Appendix A 
                                                 
9 This figure may be biased if the recontact rate is significantly lower for those who moved. 
However, even using our most conservative estimates, the vast majority of parents (75-80%) did 
not move and accommodated children.   16 
provides summary statistics of the explanatory variables. 
The characteristics of parents include shock variables, health status variables, and socio-
economic variables. Shock variables are dummy variables constructed as a change between two 
consecutive waves and are assumed to be exogenous to living arrangement decisions. All 
explanatory variables except the shock variables are defined in terms of base years. The shock 
variables include the loss of a spouse, deterioration in physical ability, deterioration in the ability 
to perform the daily life activities (ADL), the development of dementia, deterioration in the 
ability to care for others, and deterioration in spousal ability to care for others.
10
For parental health measures in the base year, we consider the ability to perform a series 
of activities. We construct two indices, one for physical ability and another for the ability to 
perform ADL. Each index is constructed as an average of values between 0 and 10 that are 
assigned to individual tasks, based on the level of difficulty. Each index is valued at 0 if all tasks 
can be performed without difficulty and at 10 if all tasks are impossible.
 
11
                                                 
10 The physical and ADL ability dummies take the value of unity if there is a major deterioration 
in the ability to perform any of the interviewed activities. 
 We also include two 
11 Physical activities used to construct the index are: (1) walking 200 or 300 meters; (2) climbing 
10 stairs without resting; (3) standing for 2 hours; (4) continuing to sit for 2 hours; (5) squatting 
and kneeling; (6) raising hands above head; (7) extending arms out in front; (8) grasping with 
fingers or using fingers easily; and (9) lifting a heavy load of 10kg. ADL include: (1) taking a   17 
dummy variables for existing dementia and cancer  conditions, and two index variables  for 
subjective health and happiness.
12
Parental demographic and economic characteristics may be relevant because they indicate 
the degree of economic independence and support available from non-children sources. With 
regard to demographics, one of the most relevant variables is the presence of a spouse. Of the 
sample, 73.6% lived with a spouse and 5.5% lost a spouse by the following wave. The eldest-son 
status of the father is another  family structure  variable of particular interest to test the 
significance of primogenital customs in modern Japan. For economic variables, we include not 
only working status but also whether the employment is full-time or part-time, because this 
affects  the availability of disposable time for domestic tasks or grandparenting in a shared 
household. As a measure of wealth, we consider ownership of the house in which the parent lives 
 The happiness index is constructed from the responses to 11 
questions about feelings and attitudes regarding the respondent’s life (PGC Morale Scale). The 
index takes a value between 0 and 10, with 10 indicating the greatest degree of happiness. 
                                                                                                                                                             
bath/shower; (2) dressing; (3) eating; (4) standing up from a bed or chair and sitting down; (5) 
walking around the house; (6) going outside; and (7) going to the bathroom. 
12 Other existing conditions, such as heart attack and fracture, and other specifications regarding 
the health variables were tried but do not provide significant results, indicating that our results 
are fairly robust.    18 
and the availability of other real estate assets.
13
The NUJLSOA offers child information regardless of whether the child lives with the 
parent. We include the number of sons and daughters, the ratio of children with a university 
degree, and the presence of at least one child that lives in the same town. We also control for the 
presence of money transfers between parents and children before coresidence. 
 
The next set of variables includes the self-reported experience, views, and future plans on 
inter-generational transfers. First, the elderly parents were asked whether they or their siblings 
had received any form of inheritance from their parents. Affirmative responses were followed up 
with, “Among which siblings was the property divided? Please do not include your mother or 
any other relatives in the response”. The following choices were given: (A) Eldest brother (or 
eldest sister, in the event that there is no eldest brother) was the only beneficiary; (B) All siblings 
were beneficiaries; (C) Only the individuals that provided care for the parents were the 
beneficiaries; and (D) Other. We create three dummy variables for (A), (B), and (C), so the 
reference group includes (D), missing responses, and those who had no such experience. 
Second, the parents were asked, “How would you like to use your assets, such as savings 
                                                 
13 The NUJLSOA has several questions about the assets of the respondents, such as whether they 
have any bank deposits, bonds, and/or stocks. However, a precise measure of wealth is difficult 
to construct.   19 
or real-estate?” The choices were: (A) Use them to support me (and my spouse) [29%]; (B) 
Leave them to my eldest son (or eldest daughter in the event that there is no eldest son) [13%]; 
(C) Leave them to all of my children [17%]; (D) Leave them to the individual who looked after 
me (and my wife/husband or parents) [10%]; (E) Leave them to the volunteer or medical facility 
who looked after or cared for me [0.4%]; (F) Other [1.6%]; and (G) I have no possessions to 
leave [9.5%]. We created five dummy variables for answers (A) or (E), (B), (D), (G), and (F) or 
missing answers. Thus, the reference category is the egalitarian group, (C). 
The next three variables relate to parental values based on the following three statements: 
(1) “A child should be expected to support and take care of his or her aged parents, as the child 
should feel a sense of gratitude to the parents for raising him/her”; (2) “It is acceptable for 
children who looked after their parents to inherit larger portions of their estate when they pass 
away”; and (3) “Men should work to support the family, and women should stay home and take 
care of the household.” For each of the responses, we create an index, assigning a value of 5 for 
“Agree”, 4 for “Somewhat agree”, 3 for “Not sure” and missing answer, 2 for “Somewhat 
disagree”, and 1 for “Disagree.” The NUJLSOA asked about parental intentions to rely on 
children in the future, and we create a dummy variable for “planning to rely on children.” 
The final set of variables captures the parental experience of informal care. They were 
asked, “Are you currently, or in the past have you been, the primary care provider for family   20 
members, and if so, for whom?” There was also a question about the impact of caregiving on 
their lifestyle. The definitions of the dummy variables for these questions are provided in Table 5. 
Table 5: Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables: shock between the base and following periods 
Lostspouse  =1 if spouse departure; 0 otherwise. Divorce and separation are included, but are quite rare. 
HS_physical  =1 if health shock in physical ability; 0 otherwise 
HS_ADL  =1 if significant health shock in ADL; 0 otherwise 
HS_dementia  =1 if development of dementia; 0 otherwise 
HS_careable  =1 if deterioration in caring ability; 0 otherwise 
SpHS_careable  =1 if deterioration in the caring ability of a spouse living together; 0 otherwise 
Explanatory variables: characteristics of the elderly parent 
Age  Age of elderly parent  
1stchild  =1 if first child; 0 otherwise 
1stson, 1stdtr  =1 if eldest son/daughter; 0 otherwise 
Educ
a  Ordered categorical variable for education (1 for junior high, 2 for high school, 3 for vocational 
school, 4 for junior college and technical institutes, 5 for university, and 6 for post graduate degree) 
Rural  =1 if living in a rural area; 0 otherwise 
Wspouse  =1 if living with spouse; 0 otherwise 
Physical
  Index 0-10 of 9 physical activities (the larger the weaker) 
ADL
  Index 0-10 of 7 ADL disability (the larger the weaker) 
EC_ […]  Dummy variables for existing conditions: dementia and cancer 
Subhealth  =0 if very healthy / healthy; 1 if average; 2 if unhealthy / very unhealthy 
Happy  Index 0-10 of happiness scale (the larger,  the happier) 
Income
a  Household income quintiles, constructed from 13 categories defined by NUJLSOA (include spousal 
income; approximate quintiles from 1 to 5, the larger the richer)) 
Work  =1 if working; 0 otherwise 
Employee  =1 if full-time employed; 0 otherwise 
Sp_Work  =1 if spouse working; 0 otherwise 
Sp_Employee  =1 if spouse full-time employed; 0 otherwise 
RAsset  =1 if owns real estate assets other than own house; 0 otherwise 
OwnHouse
b  =1 if living in a house self-owned or owned by a spouse; 0 otherwise 
FamilyHouse
b  =1 if living in a family-owned house owned by someone else; 0 otherwise 
HouseRent  =1 if living on the renting basis. (Reference group) 
HouseInh  =1 if living in a family-owned house inherited from a parent / parent-in-law 
Explanatory variables: characteristics of the children
c 
C_Onechild  =1 if parent has only one surviving child; 0 otherwise 
C_Onechildf  =1 if the only surviving child is a daughter; 0 otherwise 
C_Nson, C_Ndtr  The numbers of surviving sons and daughters 
C_Educ  The ratio of surviving children having a university degree 
C_UnmarSon, 
C_UnmarDtr  =1 if there is an unmarried son / daughter; 0 otherwise 
C_Near  =1 if at least one child lives in the same municipality 
C_Ngchild  The number of grandchildren 
C_NgchildSmall  The number of grandchildren of preschool age 
C_Birth  =1 if an additional grandchild of preschool age between survey waves; 0 otherwise 
C_MoneyFrom  =1 if financial support from a child or a child-in-law; 0 otherwise 
C_MoneyTo  =1 if financial support to a child or a child-in-law; 0 otherwise   21 
Explanatory variables: values and views of the parents 
BqExp_1stson  =1 if experienced inheritance from a parent that went to the eldest brother; 0 otherwise 
BqExp_all  =1 if experienced inheritance from a parent divided by all siblings; 0 otherwise 
BqExp_carer  =1 if experienced inheritance from a parent to only the siblings who provided care; 0 otherwise 
BqExp_other  =1 if other type of experience or no experience (Reference group); 0 otherwise 
BqIntentSelf  =1 if bequest intention “to support me and my spouse” and “to leave to volunteer medical facility 
who look after/care for me.”; 0 otherwise 
BqIntentPrimo  =1 if bequest intention “Leave to my eldest son”; 0 otherwise 
BqIntentExc  =1 if bequest intention “Leave to the one who looked after me”; 0 otherwise 
BqIntentNo  =1 if bequest intention “No possession to leave”; 0 otherwise 
BqIntentOth  =1 if bequest intention “Other” and missing answers; 0 otherwise 
BqIntentAll  =1 if bequest intension “Leave to all children” (Reference group) 
ViewCare  “A child should support and take care of aged parents out of gratitude.” 5 for agree, 4 somewhat 
agree, 3 not sure, 2 somewhat disagree, and 1 for disagree. 
ViewExchange  “Children who looked after their parents may inherit larger inheritance” 5 for agree, 4 somewhat 
agree, 3 not sure, 2 somewhat disagree, and 1 for disagree 
ViewGender  “Men should work and women should stay home and take care of the household” 5 for agree, 4 
somewhat agree, 3 not sure, 2 somewhat disagree, and 1 for disagree 
PlanDepend  =1 if “Plan to rely on a child”; 0 otherwise 
Explanatory variables: caring experience of parents 
CareExp  =1 if have experience of providing care for a family member as a primary caregiver; 0 otherwise 
CareExpParent  =1 if experience of providing care for a parent or grandparent of their own or an in-law; 0 otherwise 
CareProblem  =1 if any difficulties were encountered in the experience; 0 otherwise 
Note: Two dummy variables are also used for periods 2001-2003 and 2003-2006, with the 1999-
2001 period being the reference group. 
a: Accompanied by missing-value dummy variables, 
taking mean values for observations with a missing value. 
b:  OwnHouse  and  FamilyHouse 
include condominiums and townhouses. Joint ownership with someone else is included. The 
difference between these two is whether the parent has ownership. For those living in a family-
owned house but with missing owner information, a missing value dummy variable is 
constructed and used. 
c: Children include step and foster children but not children-in-law. 
4.  Empirical Strategy 
4.1.  Simple Cross-Sectional Analysis of Transition 
New coresidence begins when a family reaches the decision as a consequence of latent family 
bargaining. Suppose we have cross-sectional data in which we observe each family’s decision on 
the transition to coresidence, so each observation appears in the data only once. This revealed 
decision  can then be modeled as a standard binary choice problem. We observe ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ i y ,   22 
, ,..., 1 N i =  which is an indicator variable for the transition to parent-child coresidence of family 
i during a certain period.  i y  is assumed to be generated by the latent construct,
*
i y , specified as 
(1)  i i i X y ε β + =
* , 
where  i X  is a vector of covariates. The logit model arises when  i ε , conditional on  i X ,  is 
assumed to independently follow a logistic distribution. The probability that family i begins 
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where  ) (⋅ Λ  is the cumulative distribution function of logistic distribution. When other standard 
assumptions are met, we can estimate this model consistently  using  the standard maximum 
likelihood procedure. For a panel data set in which we observe consecutive coresidence decisions 
of each family, we can still legitimately apply the same framework by regarding it as a repeated 
cross-section, which is called a stacked logit framework and is a discrete representation of an 
exponential duration model.
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4.2.  Irregular Intervals 
  
                                                 
14 An exponential duration model imposes a constant hazard. We do not investigate more flexible 
duration dependence, because most of the elderly parents have been separated from their children 
for many years and the duration dependence is neither sharply identified nor of much interest. 
Furthermore, we do not have information on when the children left their parents.   23 
The NJULSOA surveys were conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006, with a longer interval 
between the last two waves. Applying wave-specific dummy variables is inappropriate because 
the effects of all covariates differ across waves. We resolve this problem by modifying the 
likelihood function. Let us redefine ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ it y ,  , ,..., 1 N i =  as an indicator variable of the 
transition to coresidence of family i  during the period between wave years t and t+1. Let It 
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a one-year transition probability, the likelihood of family i in the period between the two waves 
can be written as: 
(3)  ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]
( ) it t
it t y I
it
y I
it it it it X X X y l
− ⋅ Λ − ⋅ Λ − =
1   ) ( 1 ) ( 1 - 1   , | β β β . 
The first square bracket term represents the probability that coresidence begins in any  year 
between the two waves. Note that when It equals 1, this likelihood becomes the likelihood of a 
standard logit model with annual panel data. The estimates ofβ are interpreted as the effect of 
the covariates on the one-year transition probability. 
4.3.  Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The fact that the NUJLSOA is a panel raises concerns about the consistency of estimates when 
there is unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, unlike in the standard cross-sectional linear 
model setting, unobserved family-specific heterogeneity may cause biased estimates, even when 
the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated with any regressors and there are no   24 
substantial omitted variables. This potential bias is due to the non-linearity of the model and the 
sample selection that arises from the stopping-problem nature of our framework. To illustrate the 
second point, consider families  with unobserved lower tendencies of coresidence. In our 
framework, these families appear in the data more often in later periods than do families with 
higher coresidence tendencies because the latter are more likely to begin coresidence and thus 
drop out of the sample in early periods. In a fairly general setting, the neglect of unobserved 
heterogeneity may lead to underestimation of the coefficients even if the unobserved 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the included covariates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; pp. 617-
618). 
The use of random effects and fixed effects models is the standard approach used to 
overcome this bias. This approach, however, is not feasible in our framework, because it requires 
the removal of a large share of observations that appear only once, which creates another source 
of selection bias because the vast majority of such observations are those that began coresidence. 
Using one cross section would be another solution, but leads to a substantial loss of information. 
We use the finite mixture model as a solution, following Heckman and Singer (1984). We 
model unobserved family-specific heterogeneity non-parametrically. Specifically, we introduce a 
small number of unobserved “types”, or latent classes, across whichβ  may vary. Suppose that 
there are k latent “types” of families. For simplicity, assume that these types affect only the   25 
intercept term, so that the types affect the probability of the transition to coresidence as an 
additive random shock, ( )
k
k ℜ ∈ ν ν ν ,..., , 2 1 . Let  j π  be  the  probability associated with type j 
(mixing probability), satisfying  1 0 < < j π  and ∑ = =
k
j j 1 1 π . Then, the likelihood of individual i 
in type j at time t is defined as: 
(4)  ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) it t
it t y I
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y I
j it it it j itj X X X y l
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The individual likelihood contribution of a k component finite mixture model is: 
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where  i T  is the last period for family i. Because the constant term in  β it X  is not identified, it is 
normalized to 0. This model can be estimated by solving 
{ } ∑ = =
N
i i l L
1 , , ln ln max
π ν β
.  Introducing 
heterogeneity in other coefficient terms is a straightforward extension. This finite mixture model 
suits our framework, allowing us to utilize the panel structure of the data to reduce potential bias. 
We do not need to discard observations that appear only once. Unlike fixed effects models, we 
can estimate the impact of time-constant variables on transition. Furthermore, the non-parametric 
nature of the model affords greater flexibility. 
5.  Results 
5.1.  Main Findings 
We estimate a two-component mixture model separately by gender. Given the large number of 
covariates, the results are reported in Tables 6-9 by groups of covariates. Each table shows the   26 
results in terms of odds ratios so that the effects can be compared directly across gender. The full 
results, including the standard errors and all results from the simple logit model, are available 
from the authors. 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of the shock variables. Columns [1] and [2] 
report the results from the standard logit specification and columns [3] and [4] the results from 
the mixture logit. These two specifications use the same set of covariates. The estimated effects 
and the significance levels of the shock variables from the mixture model are generally larger 
than those from the standard logit model. This indicates downward bias under the simple logit 
specification. This is the case for all other significantly estimated coefficients. 
Table 6: The Effect of the Shock Variables on the Coresidence Transition 
  Logit  Two-Component Mixture 
Dependent Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Transition to  Fathers  Mothers  Fathers  Mothers 
 coresidence  Odds ratio  p-value  Odds ratio  p-value  Odds ratio  p-value  Odds ratio  p-value 
Common Components:             
Shocks                 
Lostspouse  1.843  0.413  4.099  0.000 ***  3.335  0.137  26.467  0.001 *** 
HS_physical  1.709  0.232  1.703  0.189  2.839  0.055 *  1.590  0.573 
HS_ADL   2.242  0.146  4.790  0.006 ***  2.777  0.249  42.221  0.006 *** 
HS_dementia  1.232  0.712  5.057  0.001 ***  1.381  0.693  116.04  0.000 *** 
HS_careable  0.910  0.733  0.708  0.221  0.909  0.785  0.584  0.239 
SpHS_careable  2.720  0.001 ***  1.306  0.514  2.885  0.006 ***  1.101  0.879 
Log-L  -346.002  -434.609  -332.774  -421.531 
N  1,944  1,902  1,944  1,902 
Chi-sq stat  176.29  180.32  106.72  75.83 
P-value   0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0816 
Pseudo R2  0.2077  0.1721     
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   27 
As expected, the estimates show that most shock variables trigger coresidence. The effect 
of Lostspouse is positive and significant for mothers, but the effect is not significant for fathers. 
For health shocks, the effect of deterioration in physical capability is significant for fathers, and 
deterioration in ADL and the development of dementia are strong determinants of coresidence 
for mothers.  The loss of caring capability has little effect on initiating coresidence, but 
deterioration in spousal caring ability has a positive and significant effect for fathers. 
The effects of parental characteristics are reported in Table 7. From this table onwards, 
we report only the mixture model results, because the logit specification produces a largely 
similar story with a potential bias. The upper panel reports the estimated coefficients of the 
variables for which we introduce two-component family-specific heterogeneity. The selection of 
variables for which we introduce heterogeneity is based on interest and estimation tractability.
15
                                                 
15 We find that dummy variables tend to exhibit poor convergence behavior and that continuous 
variables with sufficient  variance tend to aid convergence.  Several three-component 
specifications are also attempted, but they rarely converge to sensible results. 
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Table 7: Estimates on Parental Characteristics and Mixture Components 
Dependent Variable:  Two-Component Mixture 
Transition to  [3] Fathers  [4] Mothers 
 coresidence  Coefficient  Odds ratio  p-value  Coefficient  Odds ratio  p-value 
Finite mixture components:             
Type 1 (%)  14.2%  20.4% 
Age  -0.059  0.943  0.452  -0.052  0.949  0.287 
Happy  -0.407  0.665  0.005 ***  -0.013  0.987  0.863 
Subhealth   0.211  1.235  0.683  -0.527  0.591  0.096 * 
RAsset  1.845  6.325  0.012 **  1.160  3.190  0.022 ** 
Constant  -0.235  0.790  0.969  0.683  1.980  0.870 
Type 2 (%)  85.8%  79.6% 
Age  0.102  1.108  0.006 ***  -0.072  0.930  0.267 
Happy  0.297  1.346  0.006 ***  0.049  1.051  0.728 
Subhealth   0.135  1.144  0.704  -1.165  0.312  0.025 ** 
RAsset  -1.007  0.365  0.089 *  -0.392  0.676  0.647 
Constant  -18.20  0.000  0.000 ***  -4.212  0.015  0.408 
Common Components:             
Parent             
1stchild    1.153  0.681    6.079  0.018 ** 
1stson    2.555  0.031 **       
1stdtr          0.568  0.439 
Educ    0.857  0.250    0.709  0.285 
Rural    1.992  0.056 *    1.466  0.458 
Wspouse    0.348  0.021 **    0.104  0.001 *** 
Physical    0.840  0.406    1.117  0.613 
ADL    1.619  0.083 *    0.795  0.514 
EC_dementia    0.771  0.838    426.74  0.000 *** 
EC_cancer    1.380  0.682    14.194  0.001 *** 
Income    1.146  0.319    0.869  0.422 
Work    1.643  0.212    0.757  0.598 
Employee    0.967  0.951    3.089  0.343 
Sp_Work    0.924  0.871    2.514  0.163 
Sp_Employee    5.266  0.044 **    0.022  0.018 ** 
OwnHouse    5.809  0.003 ***    10.194  0.001 *** 
FamilyHouse    15.071  0.001 ***    191.94  0.000 *** 
HouseInh    0.477  0.030 **    0.447  0.072 * 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The probabilities that fathers and mothers belong to Type 1 families are  14.2% and 
20.4%, respectively, and 85.8% and 79.6% for Type 2, respectively. The estimated difference   29 
between the types  indicates  considerable  heterogeneity in coresidence decisions of Japanese 
families.  Evaluated at mean values for both fathers and mothers, Type 2 has much smaller 
probability of transition to coresidence than their Type 1 counterparts. Based on this result, we 
call Type 1 the “traditional” type and Type 2 the “modern” type.
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Summarizing the common component results in Table 7, an elderly father is more likely 
to begin coresidence when he is the eldest son, lives in a rural area, lives either without a spouse 
or with a spouse who is employed, has limitations in ADL, and lives in a self-owned or family-
owned house. Whether he has an older sister does not affect the eldest-son effect. Overall, the 
health variables have weak or no effects. An elderly mother is more likely to begin coresidence 
when she is the first-born child, lives without a spouse, has developed dementia or cancer, is 
 Traditional fathers are more 
likely to begin coresidence when they own real estate assets other than house and when they are 
unhappy. Modern fathers tend to begin coresidence when they are older, have no other assets, 
and are happy. Like traditional fathers, traditional mothers with real estate assets are more likely 
to begin coresidence. The effect of real estate assets is insignificant for modern  mothers. 
Regardless of type, mothers are more likely to begin coresidence when they are healthy. 
                                                 
16 This is because the coresidence rate is declining rapidly in Japan. In 1986, among households 
with elderly individuals, 31% consist of only one elderly individual or of only an elderly couple. 
This number steadily increased to 52% in 2007 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2008).   30 
employed, does not live with an employed spouse, and lives in a self-owned or family-owned 
house. There is no “eldest-daughter” effect for mothers. For both fathers and mothers, living in a 
house that is owned rather than rented increases  the possibility of transition considerably. 
Moreover, this effect is larger when living in a family-owned house. The majority of these cases 
(60%) occur when the house is owned by a child. Finally, these house effects are smaller if an 
owned house is inherited from the parents. 
Table 8: The Effect of Child Variables 
Dependent Variable:  Two-Component Mixture 
Transition to  [3] Fathers  [4] Mothers 
 coresidence  Odds ratio  p-value  Odds ratio  p-value 
Common Components: Children     
C_1child  0.495  0.285  0.418  0.258 
C_1childf  0.544  0.511  0.226  0.129 
C_NSon  0.996  0.988  0.494  0.038 ** 
C_NDtr  1.098  0.734  1.122  0.753 
C_Educ  1.422  0.331  0.927  0.905 
C_UnmarSon  2.738  0.007 ***  3.647  0.014 ** 
C_UnmarDtr  3.848  0.002 ***  3.753  0.017 ** 
C_Near  4.148  0.000 ***  4.120  0.002 *** 
C_NGchild  0.748  0.001 ***  0.802  0.050 ** 
C_NGchildS  1.355  0.031 **  1.833  0.010 *** 
C_Birth  2.577  0.027 **  0.674  0.623 
C_MoneyFrom  0.812  0.698  0.686  0.500 
C_MoneyTo  1.693  0.243  0.972  0.960 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 8 reports the effect of child characteristics. Overall, the number and composition of 
sons and daughters have weak effects. For both fathers and mothers, the presence of an 
unmarried child and the presence of a child living in the same town have positive and significant 
effects. The effect of grandchildren depends on age; additional school-age grandchildren lower   31 
the transition probability for fathers and mothers, but additional preschool-age grandchildren 
increase the probability of transition for mothers and the birth of a grandchild increases the 
transition probability of fathers. Money transfers between parents and children show no 
significant impact on transition. 
Table 9: The Effect of Value and Care Experience Variables 
Dependent Var:   Two-Component Mixture 
Transition to   [3] Fathers  [4] Mothers 
Coresidence  Odds ratio  p-value  Odds ratio  p-value 
Common Components: Values     
BqExp_1stson  1.525  0.222  0.745  0.549 
BqExp_all  0.700  0.469  0.876  0.835 
BqExp_carer  2.777  0.065 *  1.462  0.627 
BqIntentSelf  1.074  0.849  0.736  0.517 
BqIntentPrimo  1.916  0.232  0.995  0.995 
BqIntentExc  1.941  0.192  0.581  0.450 
BqIntentNo  1.907  0.263  2.611  0.185 
BqIntentOth  0.419  0.124  3.141  0.043 ** 
ViewCare  1.160  0.137  0.883  0.289 
ViewExchange  0.946  0.647  1.046  0.774 
ViewGender  1.146  0.196  1.477  0.003 *** 
PlanDepend  2.920  0.001 ***  0.635  0.259 
Common Components: Care Experience     
CareExp  0.757  0.597  3.868  0.052 * 
CareExpOwnP  1.967  0.248  0.880  0.807 
CareProblem  0.632  0.458  0.154  0.005 *** 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The estimated effects of the parental values and attitudes regarding inheritance and inter-
generational transfer are shown in Table 9. The first three dummy variables concern parental 
bequest experience with answers of “other” and “no experience” comprising the reference group. 
Only one coefficient is statistically significant, but all directions are consistent with the strategic   32 
bequest motive. The  experience of inheritance to the eldest son increases the transition 
probability of fathers but reduces the transition probability for mothers. Fathers and mothers who 
experienced an inheritance shared equally among siblings are less likely to begin coresidence, 
whereas those with an inheritance experience that was contingent on care provision are more 
likely to begin coresidence. These results not only support the presence of the strategic bequest 
motive but also point to significant inertia over generations in inter-generational transfer 
behavior. 
The next five variables concern self-reported bequest intention with the egalitarian 
answer being the reference group. Again, only one coefficient is significant. Still, the directions 
of the estimates appear to be largely consistent with theoretical predictions. The positive effect of 
an intention to bequeath to the eldest son on the transition probability of fathers follows Japanese 
primogenital customs and the dynasty model. The positive effect of the “exchange” intention for 
fathers is consistent with the strategic bequest motive. On the other hand, lacking any 
possessions to bequeath has a positive effect, indicating filial altruism. The “other” answer of 
mothers is significant and positive. We posit that this answer includes “I follow my husband’s 
will”, which typically represents traditional households with a patriarchal family culture. The 
next  three variables concern parental values. A positive view of filial informal care and 
traditional gender roles marginally increases the transition probability of fathers. The gender   33 
view variable is positive and significant for mothers. The expectation of future dependence on a 
child has a positive and significant effect for fathers, but is negative and insignificant for mothers. 
With regard to the care experience variables, experience as a primary caregiver increases 
the transition probability for mothers. This is consistent with the findings of Jellal and Wolff 
(2002). We also find that this effect turns negative when elderly mothers had previous difficult 
experiences with informal care. 
5.2.  Discussion 
5.2.1.  Parental Needs 
What benefits does coresidence offer to parents? We have found that the transition to 
coresidence is often associated with a higher transition rate to death (Table 3), negative health 
shocks, and poorer health status. The survey question for parental reasons for new coresidence 
reported in Table 1 also tells us that filial care provision is an important factor. Thus, our results 
strongly indicate that parents perceive informal care as a merit of coresidence with a child. On 
the other hand, parental needs for economic support are generally insignificant. Although a 
certain share of parents begin coresidence to receive financial support from children (Table 3), 
income and money transfer variables are never significant.
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17 Table 3 also suggests that coresidence directly affects the parents’ utility (in particular, 
Reasons 7 and 9). However, our regression model cannot test this possibility because the (non-
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5.2.2.  The Bequest Motive and the House Effect 
Why do children provide informal care for parents? The strategic bequest motive is the classical 
explanation. Unlike the existing literature on Japan supporting for the hypothesis (Horioka, 2002; 
Yamada, 2006; Kureishi and Wakabayashi, 2009), we find only weak evidence. The result from 
the two component model shows that although there is a group of families whose transition 
probability responds positively to parental real estate assets, this group is in the minority. The 
majority of families are less likely to begin coresidence than this minority group, but they begin 
coresidence regardless of parental assets when parental care needs exist, which contradicts the 
bequest motive. The results of bequest experience and bequest intent variables show some 
consistency with the  bequest motive, but at  low significance levels. The parental view on 
intergenerational exchange has no effect. The inheritance experience variables are also 
insignificant. Although the signs of these variables are consistent with the bequest motive, it is 
possible that what appears to be the bequest motive is actually an unobservable family culture 
that has been transmitted over generations. 
The result best supporting the strategic bequest hypothesis is house ownership. We find 
that living in an owned house has a significant impact on transition probability compared to 
                                                                                                                                                             
altruistic) utility gain of parents cannot be separated from utility gain regarding children’s utility 
(altruistic satisfaction) or from the utility gain attached to following social norms and traditions.   35 
living in a rental property. Furthermore, newly-purchased or newly-built houses have a larger 
effect than inherited, old houses. All of these findings appear consistent with the bequest motive. 
Our results, however, show that living in a family-owned house has an even larger effect on 
transition than does living in a self-owned house. This contradicts the strategic bequest theory 
because it predicts that parents retain bequeathable assets until the end of their lives. Given the 
weak evidence of the bequest motive from other variables, this large house effect may capture 
something other than the bequest motive,  such as an explicit contract between parents and 
children. Our data shows 60% of family-owned houses are owned by a child. In Japan, houses 
are typically purchased with substantial financial assistance from parents or gifted from parents 
before they die.
18
5.2.3.  Other Motives for Coresidence 
 
We have found that the number of preschool grandchildren has a positive effect on coresidence, 
but that the number of older grandchildren has a negative effect. This finding supports another 
exchange motive –  grandparenting.
19
                                                 
18 This intergenerational transfer through a house is in accordance with Tabuchi (2008). 
 Children begin living with their parents with the 
expectation of receiving childcare from their elderly parents, providing needed care in exchange. 
At the same time, this finding rejects the demonstration motive, which suggests that children 
19 Another explanation is that the presence of small grandchildren increases parental utility.   36 
would live with and take care of elderly parents when they have school-age children rather than 
infant children. 
The presence of an unmarried child has a positive effect on the transition probability. 
There are several possible explanations for this effect. First, living only with next of kin may be 
more efficient than living with in-laws, in terms of managing housework and exploiting scale 
economy.  Second, unlike married children, unmarried children may  not face conflicts or 
obligations regarding spouses and in-laws. Lastly, unmarried children include the divorced, who 
often return to the parental home. 
Our results also indicate a significant role of filial altruism. While income and assets are 
not dominating factors of coresidence, parental health deterioration (gradual deterioration for 
fathers and critical deterioration such as cancer and dementia for mothers) significantly increases 
transition probability. Health deterioration makes coresidence more costly, but children will 
begin coresidence without pecuniary reward. This observation supports the role of filial altruism 
in family living arrangement decisions. Note, however, that this finding can also be explained by 
cultural norms or other social pressures. 
5.2.4.  Other Determinants of Coresidence 
The regression also confirms other relevant determinants of coresidence. The significant positive 
effect of children living nearby suggests the importance of relocation costs. The finding that   37 
those families that are aware of the hardships of informal care tend to avoid new coresidence 
suggests that such hardships could exceed altruism and other merits. We have also found the 
significance of Japanese traditional primogenital culture. An  eldest-son effect exists, but an 
eldest-daughter effect does not. The views of mothers on traditional gender roles and living in a 
conservative rural area increase transition probability. 
Finally, we discuss significant gender differences. First, health deterioration affects 
transition probability in different ways for mothers and fathers. Gradual health deterioration 
leads to coresidence for fathers, whereas critical health conditions such as cancer and dementia 
are important determinants of coresidence for mothers. In the absence of critical conditions, the 
subjective poor health of mothers has a negative effect. The loss of a spouse has a larger positive 
effect for mothers than for fathers.
20
                                                 
20 This weaker responsiveness of fathers to spousal death is consistent with the findings in 
previous literature (Sakamoto, 2006; Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006; Takagi et al., 2007). 
 The expectation of future dependence has a positive and 
significant effect for fathers but a negative and insignificant effect for mothers. All of these 
findings are consistent with the bequest motive. Larger inheritances occur from fathers than from 
mothers (Suzuki, 2007), so the loss of a father has a larger effect than the loss of a mother. 
Accordingly, children anticipating inheritance start providing care earlier for fathers than for 
mothers because taking care of unhealthy mothers is less rewarding. For the same reason, the   38 
expectation of fathers is more binding for children than that of mothers. However, all of these 
gender differences can also be explained by Japanese patriarchal/virilocal social structures.   
6.  Conclusions 
This study extends  our knowledge about family decisions on informal care  and living 
arrangements by examining the motives of  each family member. We  advance the existing 
literature by (1) focusing on the transition to coresidence to provide a clear framework and 
delineate causal effects; (2) incorporating family heterogeneity, which has been overlooked in 
the previous literature; and (3) employing a wide range of variables and the panel structure of the 
NUJLSOA, a rich and under-utilized Japanese longitudinal data. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, the transition to parent-child coresidence is often 
associated with parental ill health, confirming that coresidence is motivated by parental care 
needs. Second, unlike previous studies on Japan, the evidence for the bequest motive is fairly 
tenuous. Third, Japanese families exhibit noticeable heterogeneity, which should be taken into 
consideration in future studies. 
The weak evidence of the bequest motive in Japan implies that filial informal care and 
coresidence is an important source of support for those elderly individuals who need care but 
cannot afford formal care. However, the increasing burden of care in Japan and other aging 
societies may overreach the capacity of filial support. The relative number of children to parents   39 
has been decreasing, and the opportunity costs of caring for parents have been growing. The 
disabled elderly live longer and caregivers are older. Although the Japanese traditional social 
structure is still functioning and facilitating coresidence for needy parents, it is certainly 
declining. Securing the well-being of both caregivers and caretakers will become a considerable 
challenge in coming decades.   40 
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics  
   Fathers          Mothers        
  No coresidence  New coresidence  No coresidence  New Coresidence 
 Variables  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Shocks                 
Lostspouse  0.021  0.143  0.035  0.184  0.054  0.225  0.120  0.326 
HS_physical  0.055  0.227  0.122  0.328  0.042  0.201  0.120  0.326 
HS_ADL  0.017  0.131  0.052  0.223  0.010  0.098  0.080  0.272 
HS_dementia  0.018  0.133  0.035  0184  0.011  0.106  0.080  0.272 
HS_careable  0.168  0.374  0.217  0.414  0.167  0.373  0.153  0.362 
SpHS_careable  0.111  0.314  0.183  0.388  0.090  0.286  0.073  0.262 
Parent                 
Age  74.564  5.994  75.704  6.393  74.441  6.088  75.301  6.263 
1stchild  0.431  0.495  0.557  0.499  0.473  0.499  0.547  0.499 
1stson  0.687  0.464  0.783  0.414         
1stdtr          0.605  0.489  0.627  0.485 
Educ  2.007  1.387  1.741  1.234  1.557  0.764  1.438  0.617 
EducMissing  0.006  0.077  0.017  0.131  0.010  0.101  0.007  0.082 
Rural  0.313  0.464  0.374  0.486  0.309  0.462  0.347  0.478 
Wspouse  0.905  0.293  0.826  0.381  0.583  0.493  0.487  0.501 
Physical  0.454  1.084  0.473  1.011  0.677  1.239  0.698  1.195 
ADL  0.124  0.660  0.197  0.857  0.147  0.654  0.162  0.748 
EC_dementia  0.013  0.114  0.017  0.131  0.005  0.067  0.033  0.180 
EC_cancer  0.040  0.196  0.035  0.184  0.030  0.170  0.053  0.225 
Subhealth  0.850  0.764  0.870  0.822  0.952  0.761  0.880  0.777 
Happy  5.821  3.187  5.717  3.274  5.283  3.336  4.850  3.430 
Income  3.192  1.278  3.070  1.282  2.518  1.302  2.273  1.242   45 
IncomeMissing  0.145  0.352  0.174  0.381  0.177  0.382  0.207  0.406 
Work  0.296  0.457  0.383  0.488  0.183  0.386  0.200  0.401 
Employee  0.090  0.286  0.113  0.318  0.022  0.146  0.027  0.162 
Sp_Work  0.163  0.369  0.217  0.414  0.179  0.383  0.127  0.334 
Sp_Employee  0.019  0.137  0.061  0.240  0.039  0.193  0.007  0.082 
Reasset  0.385  0.487  0.426  0.497  0.341  0.474  0.340  0.475 
OwnHouse  0.795  0.404  0.817  0.388  0.705  0.456  0.620  0.487 
FamilyHouse  0.017  0.129  0.096  0.295  0.057  0.231  0.200  0.401 
OwnerMissing  0.049  0.216  0.035  0.184  0.069  0.254  0.087  0.282 
HouseInh  0.328  0.469  0.348  0.478  0.349  0.477  0.373  0.485 
Children                 
C_Onechild  0.164  0.370  0.104  0.307  0.196  0.397  0.167  0.374 
C_Onechildf  0.082  0.274  0.035  0.184  0.092  0.290  0.073  0.262 
C_Nson  1.125  0.891  1.265  0.974  1.173  0.937  1.140  0.883 
C_Ndtr  1.162  0.955  1.180  0.912  1.185  0.979  1.360  1.064 
C_Educ  0.377  0.419  0.368  0.510  0.332  0.406  0.234  0.360 
C_UnmarSon  0.166  0.372  0.261  0.441  0.130  0.336  0.187  0.391 
C_UnmarDtr  0.098  0.297  0.200  0.402  0.124  0.330  0.193  0.396 
C_Near  0.499  0.500  0.739  0.441  0.543  0.498  0.680  0.468 
C_Ngchild  3.790  2.555  3.487  2.162  4.182  2.787  4.340  3.108 
C_NgchildSmall  0.577  1.052  0.583  0.955  0.354  0.800  0.367  0.789 
C_Birth  0.091  0.288  0.139  0.348  0.052  0.222  0.040  0.197 
C_MoneyFrom  0.055  0.228  0.104  0.307  0.108  0.311  0.133  0.341 
C_MoneyTo  0.085  0.279  0.122  0.328  0.090  0.287  0.113  0.318 
Values and views                 
BqExp_1stson  0.214  0.410  0.261  0.441  0.163  0.369  0.153  0.362 
BqExp_all  0.123  0.329  0.104  0.307  0.111  0.314  0.100  0.301 
BqExp_carer  0.050  0.217  0.070  0.256  0.052  0.222  0.033  0.180 
BqIntentSelf  0.411  0.492  0.339  0.475  0.382  0.486  0.280  0.451 
BqIntentPrimo  0.077  0.267  0.113  0.318  0.080  0.272  0.067  0.250 
BqIntentExc  0.063  0.243  0.122  0.328  0.089  0.285  0.087  0.282 
BqIntentNo  0.072  0.259  0.070  0.256  0.119  0.324  0.147  0.355 
BqIntentOth  0.160  0.367  0.130  0.338  0.143  0.350  0.227  0.420 
ViewCare  3.229  1.575  3.765  1.512  3.052  1.567  3.173  1.478 
ViewExchange  4.026  1.249  4.226  1.178  3.991  1.255  3.900  1.262 
ViewGender  3.695  1.443  3.991  1.386  3.487  1.542  3.847  1.325 
PlanDepend  0.214  0.410  0.452  0.500  0.332  0.471  0.387  0.489 
Care Experience               
CareExp  0.269  0.444  0.304  0.462  0.567  0.496  0.533  0.501 
CareExpParent  0.156  0.363  0.209  0.408  0.320  0.467  0.327  0.471 
CareProblem  0.090  0.287  0.096  0.295  0.248  0.432  0.193  0.396 
N  1,829  115  1,752  150 
 